Advanced Microeconomic Theory (Record no. 5113)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 06515nam a22002177a 4500 |
| 005 - DATE & TIME | |
| control field | 20201016131132.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 201016b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| International Standard Book Number | 9780273731917 |
| Price | 20,094 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE | |
| Original cataloging agency | S.X.U.K |
| 041 ## - Language | |
| Language | English |
| 082 ## - DDC NUMBER | |
| Classification number | R 338.5 JEH(ADV)Ed3 |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Jehle, Geoffrey A. |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Advanced Microeconomic Theory |
| Statement of responsibility | Geoffrey A. Jehle; Philip J. Reny |
| 250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT | |
| Edition statement | 3rd ed. |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc | England |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc | Pearson Education Limited |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc | 2011 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Pages | xvi, 656 |
| Other Details | H.B |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | Table of Contents<br/>PREFACE<br/><br/> <br/><br/>PART 1: ECONOMIC AGENTS<br/><br/> <br/><br/>CHAPTER 1: CONSUMER THEORY<br/><br/>1.1 Primitive Notions<br/><br/>1.2 Preferences and Utility<br/><br/>1.2.1 Preference Relations<br/><br/>1.2.2 The Utility Function<br/><br/>1.3 The Consumer's Problem<br/><br/>1.4 Indirect Utility and Expenditure<br/><br/>1.4.1 The Indirect Utility Function<br/><br/>1.4.2 The Expenditure Function<br/><br/>1.4.3 Relations Between the Two<br/><br/>1.5 Properties of Consumer Demand<br/><br/>1.5.1 Relative Prices and Real Income<br/><br/>1.5.2 Income and Substitution Effects<br/><br/>1.5.3 Some Elasticity Relations<br/><br/>1.6 Exercises<br/><br/> <br/><br/>CHAPTER 2: TOPICS IN CONSUMER THEORY<br/><br/>2.1 Duality: A Closer Look<br/><br/>2.1.1 Expenditure and Consumer Preferences<br/><br/>2.1.2 Convexity and Monotonicity<br/><br/>2.1.3 Indirect Utility and Consumer Preferences<br/><br/>2.2 Integrability<br/><br/>2.3 Revealed Preference<br/><br/>2.4 Uncertainty<br/><br/>2.4.1 Preferences<br/><br/>2.4.2 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility<br/><br/>2.4.3 Risk Aversion<br/><br/>2.5 Exercises<br/><br/> <br/><br/>CHAPTER 3: THEORY OF THE FIRM<br/><br/>3.1 Primitive Notions<br/><br/>3.2 Production<br/><br/>3.2.1 Returns to Scale and Varying Proportions<br/><br/>3.3 Cost<br/><br/>3.4 Duality in Production<br/><br/>3.5 The Competitive Firm<br/><br/>3.5.1 Profit Maximisation<br/><br/>3.5.2 The Profit Function<br/><br/>3.6 Exercises<br/><br/> <br/><br/>PART 2: MARKETS AND WELFARE<br/><br/> <br/><br/>CHAPTER 4: PARTIAL EQUALIBRIUM<br/><br/>4.1 Perfect Competition<br/><br/>4.2 Imperfect Competition<br/><br/>4.2.1 Cournot Oligopoly<br/><br/>4.2.2 Bertrand Oligopoly<br/><br/>4.2.3 Monopolistic Competition<br/><br/>4.3 Equilibrium and Welfare<br/><br/>4.3.1 Price and Individual Welfare<br/><br/>4.3.2 Efficiency of the Competitive Outcome<br/><br/>4.3.3 Efficiency and Total Surplus Maximisation<br/><br/>4.4 Exercises<br/><br/> <br/><br/>CHAPTER 5: GENERAL EQUALIBRIUM<br/><br/>5.1 Equilibrium in Exchange<br/><br/>5.2 Equilibrium in Competitive Market Systems<br/><br/>5.2.1 Existence of Equilibrium<br/><br/>5.2.2 Efficiency<br/><br/>5.3 Equilibrium in Production<br/><br/>5.3.1 Producers<br/><br/>5.3.2 Consumers<br/><br/>5.3.3 Equilibrium<br/><br/>5.3.4 Welfare<br/><br/>5.4 Contingent Plans<br/><br/>5.4.1 Time<br/><br/>5.4.2 Uncertainty<br/><br/>5.4.3 Walrasian Equilibrium with Contingent Commodities<br/><br/>5.5 Core and Equilibria<br/><br/>5.5.1 Replica Economies<br/><br/>5.6 Exercises<br/><br/> <br/><br/>CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE<br/><br/>6.1 The Nature of the Problem<br/><br/>6.2 Social Choice and Arrow's Theorem<br/><br/>6.2.1 A Diagrammatic Proof<br/><br/>6.3 Measurability, Comparability, and Some Possibilities<br/><br/>6.3.1 The Rawlsian Form<br/><br/>6.3.2 The Utilitarian Form<br/><br/>6.3.3 Flexible Forms<br/><br/>6.4 Justice<br/><br/>6.5 Social Choice and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem<br/><br/>6.6 Exercises<br/><br/> <br/><br/>PART 3: STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR<br/><br/> <br/><br/>CHAPTER 7: GAME THEORY<br/><br/>7.1 Strategic Decision Making<br/><br/>7.2 Strategic Form Games<br/><br/>7.2.1 Dominant Strategies<br/><br/>7.2.2 Nash Equilibrium<br/><br/>7.2.3 Incomplete Information<br/><br/>7.3 Extensive Form Games<br/><br/>7.3.1 Game Trees: A Diagrammatic Representation<br/><br/>7.3.2 An Informal Analysis of Take-Away<br/><br/>7.3.3 Extensive Form Game Strategies<br/><br/>7.3.4 Strategies and Payoffs<br/><br/>7.3.5 Games of Perfect Information and Backward Induction Strategies<br/><br/>7.3.6 Games of Imperfect Information and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium<br/><br/>7.3.7 Sequential Equilibrium<br/><br/>7.4 Exercises<br/><br/> <br/><br/>CHAPTER 8: INFORMATION ECONOMICS <br/><br/>8.1 Adverse Selection<br/><br/>8.1.1 Information and the Efficiency of Market Outcomes<br/><br/>8.1.2 Signalling<br/><br/>8.1.3 Screening<br/><br/>8.2 Moral Hazard and the Principal-Agent Problem<br/><br/>8.2.1 Symmetric Information<br/><br/>8.2.2 Asymmetric Information<br/><br/>8.3 Information and Market Performance<br/><br/>8.4 Exercises<br/><br/> <br/><br/>CHAPTER 9: AUCTIONS AND MECHANISM DESIGN <br/><br/>9.1 The Four Standard Auctions<br/><br/>9.2 The Independent Private Values Model<br/><br/>9.2.1 Bidding Behaviour in a First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction<br/><br/>9.2.2 Bidding Behaviour in a Dutch Auction<br/><br/>9.2.3 Bidding Behaviour in a Second-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction<br/><br/>9.2.4 Bidding Behaviour in an English Auction<br/><br/>9.2.5 Revenue Comparisons<br/><br/>9.3 The Revenue Equivalence Theorem<br/><br/>9.3.1 Incentive-Compatible Direct Selling Mechanisms: A Characterisation<br/><br/>9.3.2 Efficiency<br/><br/>9.4 Designing a Revenue Maximising Mechanism<br/><br/>9.4.1 The Revelation Principle<br/><br/>9.4.2 Individual Rationality<br/><br/>9.4.3 An Optimal Selling Mechanism<br/><br/>9.4.4 A Closer Look at the Optimal Selling Mechanism<br/><br/>9.4.5 Efficiency, Symmetry, and Comparison to the Four Standard Auctions<br/><br/>9.5 Designing Allocatively Efficient Mechanisms<br/><br/>9.5.1 Quasi-Linear Utility and Private Values<br/><br/>9.5.2 Ex Post Pareto Efficiency<br/><br/>9.5.3 Direct Mechanisms, Incentive Comparability and the Revelation Principle<br/><br/>9.5.4 The Vickery-Clarke-Groves Mechanism<br/><br/>9.5.5 Achieving a Balanced Budget: Expected Externality Mechanisms<br/><br/>9.5.6 Property Rights, Outside Options, and Individual Rationality Contraints<br/><br/>9.5.7 The IR-VCG Mechanism: Sufficiency of Expected Surplus<br/><br/>9.6 Exercises<br/><br/> <br/><br/>MATHEMATICAL APPENDICES<br/><br/> <br/><br/>CHAPTER A1: SETS AND MAPPINGS<br/><br/>A1.1 Elements of Logic<br/><br/>A1.1.1 Necessity and Sufficiency<br/><br/>A1.1.2 Theorems and Proofs<br/><br/>A1.2 Elements of Set Theory<br/><br/>A1.2.1 Notation and Basic Concepts<br/><br/>A1.2.2 Convex Sets<br/><br/>A1.2.3 Relations and Functions<br/><br/>A1.3 A Little Topology<br/><br/>A1.3.1 Continuity<br/><br/>A1.3.2 Some Existence Theorems<br/><br/>A1.4 Real-Valued Functions<br/><br/>A1.4.1 Related Sets<br/><br/>A1.4.2 Concave Functions<br/><br/>A1.4.3 Quasiconcave Functions<br/><br/>A1.4.4 Convex and Quasiconvex Functions<br/><br/>A1.5 Exercises<br/><br/> <br/><br/>CHAPTER A2: CALCULUS AND OPTIMISATION <br/><br/>A2.1 Calculus<br/><br/>A2.1.1 Functions of a Single Variable<br/><br/>A2.1.2 Functions of Several Variables<br/><br/>A2.1.3 Homogeneous Functions<br/><br/>A2.2 Optimisation<br/><br/>A2.2.1 Real-Valued Functions of Several Variables<br/><br/>A2.2.2 Second-Order Conditions<br/><br/>A2.3 Constrained Optimisation<br/><br/>A2.3.1 Equality Constraints<br/><br/>A2.3.2 Lagrange's Method<br/><br/>A2.3.3 Geometric Interpretation<br/><br/>A2.3.4 Second-Order Conditions<br/><br/>A2.3.5 Inequality Constraints<br/><br/>A2.3.6 Kuhn-Tucker Conditions<br/><br/>A2.4 Optimality Theorems<br/><br/>A2.5 Separation Theorems<br/><br/>A2.6 Exercises<br/><br/>LIST OF THEOREMS<br/><br/>LIST OF DEFINITIONS<br/><br/>HINTS AND ANSWERS<br/><br/>REFERENCES<br/><br/>INDEX |
| 650 ## - Subject | |
| Subject | Microeconomics |
| 700 ## - Added Entry Personal Name | |
| Relator Code | auth. |
| Added Entry Personal Name | Reny, Philip J. |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Reference |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Source of classification or shelving scheme | Damaged status | Not for loan | Koha collection | Location (home branch) | Sublocation or collection (holding branch) | Shelving location | Date acquired | Source of acquisition | Cost, normal purchase price | Serial Enumeration / chronology | Koha full call number | Barcode (Accession No.) | Koha date last seen | Copy Number | Price effective from | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dewey Decimal Classification | Not For Loan | Reference | St. Xavier's University, Kolkata | St. Xavier's University, Kolkata | Reference Section | 09/23/2020 | New Aryan | 20094.00 | S.X.U.K | R 338.5 JEH(ADV)Ed3 | UE083 | 10/16/2020 | 5345 | 10/16/2020 | Reference Economics | |||
| Dewey Decimal Classification | Not For Loan | Reference | St. Xavier's University, Kolkata | St. Xavier's University, Kolkata | Reference Section | 09/23/2020 | New Aryan | 20094.00 | S.X.U.K | R 338.5 JEH(ADV)Ed3.C1 | UE084 | 10/16/2020 | 5346 | 10/16/2020 | Reference Economics |