000			01382cam a22002538i 4500
005			20210804170416.0
008			191213t20202013nyu b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2019056230
020			_a9781108636049
020			_a9781108825146 _c5383.92
040			_aS.X.U.K
041	1		_aEnglish
082	0	0	_aR 519.3 _bMAS(GAM)Ed2
100	1		_aZamir, Shmuel,
245	1	0	_aGame theory / _cMichael Maschler, Eilon Solan, Shmuel Zamir ; translated from Hebrew by Ziv Hellman ; English editor, Mike Borns.
250			_a2nd ed.
260			_aNew Delhi _bCambride _cc2020
300			_a1025p _bPB.
500			_aTable of Contents 1. The game of chess 2. Utility theory 3. Extensive-form games 4. Strategic-form games 5. Mixed strategies 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem 7. Equilibrium refinements 8. Correlated equilibria 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model 11. The universal belief space 12. Auctions 13. Repeated games 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs 15. Social choice 16. Bargaining games 17. Coalitional games with transferable utility 18. The core 19. The Shapley value 20. The bargaining set 21. The nucleolus 22. Stable matching 23. Appendices.
650		0	_aGAME THEORY
700	1		_4ed. _aMaschler, Michael,
700	1		_4ed. _aSolan, Eilon,
942			_cREF
999			_c5847 _d5847